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We document a strong correlation in the brand of automobile chosen
by parents and their adult children, using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics. This correlation could represent transmission of
brand preferences across generations, or it could result from correla-
tion in family characteristics that determine brand choice. We present
a variety of empirical specifications that lend support to the former
interpretation and to a mechanism that relies at least in part on state
dependence. We then discuss implications of intergenerational brand
preference transmission for automakers’ product-line strategies and for
the strategic pricing of vehicles to different age groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THIS PAPER, WE EMPIRICALLY INVESTIGATE the intergenerational transmis-
sion of preferences for automobile brands (e.g., Ford or GM) and explore
the implications of our results for the automobile market. Our investigation
makes use of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is unique
in that it follows multiple households within the same family over time. In
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particular, it surveys adult children who grew up in a PSID household but
have since left and formed their own households. In several recent waves,
the PSID has included questions about automobile ownership. Using these
data, we find strong correlations in automobile choices across generations
within a family. Specifically, a child whose parent has recently purchased a
given brand is 39% more likely to choose that same brand (a 5.6 percentage-
point increase on a base of 14.3%) than a demographically similar child
whose parent did not choose that brand. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to document this correlation. A central challenge of our paper
is to distinguish empirically the mechanisms that potentially underlie this
observed correlation, with a focus on identifying brand preference trans-
mission.
We define brand preference somewhat broadly as a situation in which a
consumer prefers one automobile brand over another, holding constant
major vehicle attributes (such as size and performance) and consumer
characteristics (including demographics and geography).1 This definition
allows intergenerational brand preference transmission to be driven by
either intergenerational state dependence or direct brand preference inherit-
ance. In intergenerational state dependence, the brand choices of parents
influence their children’s preferences (and therefore choices) because chil-
dren have contact with their parents’ vehicles and develop tastes for minor
design details or nostalgic childhood associations with a brand, or because
parental ownership generates information about performance and reliabil-
ity that is conveyed to children. In direct brand preference inheritance, the
brand preferences of parents influence their children’s preferences (and
therefore choices) independently of parental brand choices. For instance,
parents might tell their children about their long-term affinity for a brand,
or parents might learn about a brand from friends or advertisements and
then convey this information to their children prior to purchasing the
brand themselves. Since either mechanism can create cross-household cor-
relation in brand choices, separate identification of these two mechanisms
in our data is difficult. We do find, however, that the correlation between
the brand choices of parents and the subsequent choices of their children is
stronger for vehicles that were purchased while the children still lived at
home and were therefore more exposed to the vehicle. This evidence sug-
gests that intergenerational state dependence is at least one of the mecha-
nisms driving the correlations we observe.
Intergenerational correlation in brand choices could also arise from
familial correlations of demographic or geographic factors that determine
brand choice. Demographics predict brand choice because consumers with
different demographics will prefer different bundles of attributes, and each
brand offers a different set of attribute bundles in its products. For
1 The distinction between attributes and brands can be blurry, as we discuss below.
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example, wealthier households will be more likely to purchase high-end
European brands, while larger households will be more likely to choose
brands that offer minivans. Similarly, geographic factors, such as terrain or
proximity to dealers and repair shops, will also favor certain brands. To
identify intergenerational brand preference transmission, we require that
the unobservable characteristics (apart from brand preference itself) that
influence the brand choices of parents be uncorrelated with the unobserv-
able characteristics that influence the brand choices of children. This iden-
tification problem is challenging because, in general, we expect parents and
children to share many characteristics, such as wealth, political beliefs, and
geographic location, that plausibly influence brand choice.
We attempt to insulate our estimates from the mundane brand choice
correlations that are driven by these similarities in four ways. First, we
demonstrate that controlling for the rich set of demographic factors avail-
able in the PSID has little effect on our estimated brand choice correlations.
Second, we show that correlations remain strong when fine geographic
controls, which should capture supply factors and consumer sorting, are
introduced non-parametrically. Third, we repeat our analyses for a pair of
firms—GM and Ford—that offer sets of products such that, for almost any
model sold by one firm, a vehicle with a very similar bundle of attributes is
available from the other firm. Both brands are also traditional U.S. manu-
facturers with unionized workforces and similar dealership networks. It is
therefore difficult to find demographic factors that would explain house-
holds’ choices between these two brands (indeed, we will show that the
observed characteristics in the PSID have essentially no power to explain
households’ choices between Ford and GM), so that the brand choice
correlations we observe in this subsample can be more credibly attributed to
brand preference transmission. Fourth, and finally, we show that young
adults are particularly influenced by vehicles that were purchased by their
parents while they were still living at home. This systematic variation in
brand choice correlations is consistent with brand preference transmission—
and intergenerational state dependence in particular—rather than mere
correlation of characteristics.
Intergenerational brand preference transmission has several implications
for automakers’ strategies. Such transmission enhances the advantage that
brand loyalty gives to incumbent firms because young consumers—who
would otherwise be free of loyalty to any firm—arrive at the new car
market with preferences inherited from their parents. Furthermore, under
the state dependence mechanism, automakers gain loyalty among a
future generation of customers when they sell cars to parents, which puts
downward pressure on the prices of vehicles targeted to parents. Finally,
it is widely believed in the industry that a brand’s entry-level vehicles
increase firm profits in part by ‘leading’ young consumers to purchase
more expensive models from the same firm later in life. In the presence of
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intergenerational transmission, targeting expensive models to older con-
sumers will also increase profits in the entry-level market by endowing
young consumers with brand loyalty, generating a closed loop of benefits to
vertical product differentiation.
We discuss these implications further in the body of the paper, and we
flesh out the potential implications for pricing behavior more fully in the
Appendix on the Journal’s website, where we derive and calibrate a simple
model of two firms competing in two market segments for overlapping
generations of old and young consumers. This model shows that when
older consumers prefer the brand they chose while young but children do
not inherit any such preference from their parents, then firms will ‘invest’ in
brand loyalty by offering lower prices to young consumers and will
‘harvest’ this loyalty by charging high prices to older consumers. When
consumers inherit a preference for the brand their parents chose, however,
then equilibrium prices charged to older consumers fall as firms compete
for loyalty among the next generation of consumers. Meanwhile, prices for
young consumers rise, as firms take advantage of this loyalty.
Our analysis relates to several existing literatures. First, our research
adds to the evidence on endogenous preference formation from several
recent studies on tastes for food (Birch [1999], Logan and Rhode [2010],
Atkin [2013]), female labor supply (Fernández et al. [2004]), packaged
goods (Bronnenberg et al. [2012]), and preferences for redistribution
(Luttmer and Singhal [2011]) that suggest that tastes and preferences may
be determined by prior behavior and experience. Second, previous work
has studied brand loyalty in the automobile market (Mannering and
Winston [1985, 1991], Train and Winston [2007]). While these papers docu-
ment within-household brand loyalty, the automobile literature has, to the
best of our knowledge, not previously documented intergenerational cor-
relation in brand choice.
Third, our paper relates to the broader literature that studies the mag-
nitude and implications of within-household brand loyalty (sometimes
referred to as switching costs) and brand preference persistence. A number
of papers, such as Klemperer [1987], Dubé et al. [2009], Doganoglu [2010],
and Somaini and Einav [2013], focus on the implications of brand loyalty
for equilibrium prices, while others focus on empirically documenting the
strength of brand loyalty and brand preferences, typically examining
markets for consumer packaged goods (Bronnenberg et al. [2009], Dubé
et al. [2010], Bronnenberg et al. [2012]). Relative to consumer packaged
goods, automobiles are much larger expenses, they are purchased less
frequently, and the product offerings are more heterogeneous. Brand
loyalty in the automobile sector typically involves individuals purchasing
quite different products that share a brand label, whereas the literature on
packaged goods is better characterized as repeat purchases of the same
item. For small purchases, brand loyalty may be understood as a heuristic
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to aid in quick decision-making, which is likely quite different from the role
that brands play in purchasing an automobile.
Finally, our work has parallels in the extensive peer effects and social
interactions literatures (Manski [1993, 2000]). Whereas much of this litera-
ture studies how individuals are influenced by the aggregate behavior and
characteristics of a reference group, we focus on how parents and children
are influenced by the choices and preferences of a small number of indi-
vidual family members. Of course, peer effects in automobile purchasing
likely extend beyond the family to friends, neighbors, and co-workers. We
view parent-to-child preference transmission as a particularly important
case of this broader set of peer effects because: (a) parent-child pairs are
often more easily identified in data than many other relationships; (b)
parent-child relationships have been shown (often using PSID data) to be
particularly important for many other economic variables such as income
and education (Solon [1992, 1999], Black and Devereux [2011]); and (c) our
data indicate that parent-to-child transmission is more powerful than that
for other within-family links, such as sibling-to-sibling.
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we present
a framework for interpreting cross-household correlations in brand
choices. We then describe our data in Section III, and we report our
empirical results regarding correlations in brand choice across generations
in Section IV. Section V discusses the implications of intergenerational
brand preference transmission for automobile markets. Section VI
concludes.
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF INTERGENERATIONAL VEHICLE CHOICE
In this section, we present a simple model of household vehicle choice that
clarifies possible mechanisms by which choices may be correlated across
families and the empirical challenges of separately identifying them. We
begin by noting that the distinction between vehicle brands—on which we
focus in this paper—and vehicle attributes is blurry. It is tempting to define
a brand as something that is independent of all vehicle attributes, as if, for
instance, Ford and GM vehicles were identical apart from the logo stamped
on the grill. In practice, vehicles of different brands will differ in ‘minor’
features, including trim style, dashboard layouts, and perceived reliability,
even for cars that share identical measurable characteristics such as size,
power, and cargo space. We define a brand in a way that encompasses these
‘minor’ characteristics so that a brand preference might be derived from,
for example, a preference to have the dashboard controls laid out in a
particular way. In contrast, when we speak of preferences for attributes, we
refer specifically to major vehicle characteristics, such as class, horsepower,
size, and fuel economy. We believe that making this distinction between
brands and attributes, thusly defined, is useful because the transmission of
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preferences for brands has a different set of implications than does the
transmission of preferences for attributes. The former is primarily relevant
for automakers’ pricing, marketing, and product line strategies, while the
latter is additionally relevant for public policies aimed at addressing the
externalities of vehicle use.
Consider a household i in family f that purchases vehicle j at time t. Let
the utility that household i derives from this purchase be denoted by:
(1) U g D Xifjt ift j ifjt= ( )+, ; ,β θ
where Dift denotes a vector of observed and unobserved demographic and
location-specific characteristics of household i, such as income, education,
climate, and terrain. These characteristics interact with Xj, which denotes
the attributes (including brand) of vehicle j, through the function g(·) and
parameter vector β. This interaction allows observable and unobservable
characteristics of households and their locations to influence vehicle choice
in a variety of ways. For example, rural households may tend to choose
pickup trucks, wealthy households may tend to purchase large SUV’s,
pro-union households may tend to purchase U.S. brands, and households
living close to a Ford dealership may tend to purchase Fords. Finally, θifjt
denotes a preference for vehicle j that is unrelated to demographic or
location-specific factors. We focus on influences from other family
members as determinants of θifjt, but other factors may exist, such as
exposure to advertisements, prior driving experiences, idiosyncratic tastes
(e.g., for a particular color or trim), or vehicle market conditions at the time
of purchase.
Intergenerational brand preference transmission is expressed in our
model as a correlation in θifjt across households within families, which leads
to correlation in vehicle brand choices. Cross-household correlation in θifjt
could stem from intergenerational state dependence, whereby parental
choices influence child preferences. For example, if a child’s parents pur-
chased a string of GM vehicles, then that child may have nostalgic feelings
for GM, a taste for the unique features of GM’s design (e.g., the layout of
the instrument panel or the feel of the seats), superior information about
GM’s performance and reliability, or simply a ‘comfort level’ with the
brand. Alternatively, correlation in θifjt could arise from direct inheritance
of preferences from parent to child in a way that is not mediated by brand
choice itself. For instance, parents might have a belief that Fords have a
better-looking trim than do GM’s and instill this belief in their children
during their childhood. Direct preference inheritance can also occur later in
life. For example, parents might be exposed to a positive review of Ford
and tell their children about what they read. This mechanism may ulti-
mately lead to a correlation of parents’ and children’s choices, but it does
not operate through state dependence or experience.
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Correlations in households’ vehicle choices may also arise through cross-
household correlations in Dift. It is natural to expect such correlations to
exist; Solon [1992], for example, documents strong intergenerational cor-
relation of income. If households with high incomes are more likely to
purchase SUV’s and European luxury brands, then this correlation in
income across generations will lead to correlations in vehicle choices across
generations. Thus, a fundamental empirical challenge of our work is to
identify vehicle choice correlations that arise from preference transmission
(due to either intergenerational state dependence or direct preference inher-
itance) separately from those that arise from similarities in demographic
and geographic characteristics. This identification is important because it is
only the former set of channels that is relevant for the strategic implications
we consider.
Identification of the ‘true’ transmission of vehicle preferences from
parents to children is most clear when there is exogenous variation that
causes the parents to purchase a new vehicle brand, conditional on the
parents’ and children’s demographics. For example, the parents’ purchase
of a Ford may have been driven by a nationwide promotional campaign
that coincided with the month in which they wanted to buy a new car, or
perhaps the weather was particularly nice when the parents test-drove the
Ford but stormy when they test-drove the GM.2 Ideally, we would identify
the transmission of vehicle preferences from parents to children using an
instrumental variable for factors such as these that shift the choices or
preferences of parents but not their children. However, all of our attempts
in this direction have been substantially underpowered given our modest
sample size.3 We therefore employ several alternative approaches. First, we
leverage the wealth of demographic and location information within the
PSID dataset to control directly for potential confounding factors. Despite
being able to use a rich set of covariates (including census tract fixed
effects), one might nonetheless be concerned that influential unobserved
factors remain. For instance, if a family is pro-union, all of that family’s
households might have a preference for U.S. brands. Thus, we also inves-
tigate a subset of the data for which correlated unobserved factors are
unlikely to be important: choices between Ford and GM. Both of these
2 These two examples are consistent with the intergenerational state dependence mecha-
nism. Examples consistent with direct brand preference inheritance include the parents’
reading a positive review of Ford (and then telling their child about the review) or being
exposed to idiosyncratic good news about Ford (e.g., Ford vehicles win auto races watched by
the parents).
3 The most obvious instrumental variable is the U.S. market share of the parents’ chosen
brand at the time of the parents’ purchase. However, in an IV version of the regression
corresponding to column 2 of Table II, the first-stage F-statistic for this instrument is only
7.06, and the estimated coefficient on parents’ brand is −0.127 with a standard error of 0.344.
This result compares to an OLS coefficient of 0.093 and standard error of 0.008, as reported
below.
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automakers produce a wide range of models with similar attributes and are
‘iconic’ U.S.-based firms, so that it is difficult to imagine demographic
characteristics that would drive the choice between one brand or the other.
That is, if demographic factors cause an individual to prefer the particular
bundle of attributes offered in one of the models made by Ford, it is nearly
certain that there is a counterpart made by GM that offers a very similar set
of attributes available in the market. Thus, our identifying assumption—
that the omitted factors driving the child’s brand choice (apart from brand
preference itself) are idiosyncratic and not correlated with the unobserved
factors driving the parents’ brand choice, conditional on observed demo-
graphics and location—is more plausible than in the full sample of all
brands. While a powerful, valid instrument would obviously be optimal for
identification, we believe that this subsample approach brings us close to
the ideal setting in which idiosyncratic factors push parents towards one
brand rather than another.
An even more challenging empirical problem is the separate identification
of the extent to which brand preference transmission is driven by state
dependence or direct preference inheritance. This distinction is important
when considering implications of brand preference transmission for firms’
pricing strategies. If only direct preference inheritance is at play, then
lowering prices to boost market share among parents will not affect their
children’s future demand for a brand, whereas the opposite is true if state
dependence is at work. This identification problem is similar to one common
in the marketing literature, in which one observes a series of brand choices by
a single household and then tries to determine whether that household’s
choices are state-dependent or whether they simply reflect a serially-
correlated preference for a particular brand (see, for example, Dubé et al.
[2010]). Ideally, we would solve this problem using an instrumental variable,
such as vehicle prices, that affects parents’ brand choices but not their
preferences. However, this strategy is severely under-powered in our
setting.4 Therefore, we adopt the alternative strategy of studying systematic
patterns in brand choice correlations that speak differentially to state
dependence versus preference inheritance. In particular, Sub-section IV(iv)
studies whether the observed choice correlations are stronger when house-
holds have a relatively high level of exposure to the choices of their parents.
This systematic variation would be consistent with state dependence but not
direct preference inheritance. Moreover, it serves as an additional opportu-
nity to help rule out the possibility that the observed choice correlations are
simply an artifact of correlated demographics between parents and children.
4 Clearly, if the market share instrument discussed above fails to yield sufficient power, a
price instrument will fail as well because price effects operate through market shares. More-
over, to the extent that price changes are driven by demand shocks, this instrument may not
cleanly separate state dependence from preference inheritance.
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Finally, we note that when we study correlations between children’s and
parents’ purchases, it may be that the child is influencing the parent rather
than the other way around. While some of our specifications will explicitly
include child-to-parent (and, more broadly, relative-to-relative) transmis-
sion in the estimated correlations, for the most part we attempt to focus on
parent-to-child preference transmission by studying cases in which the
parents’ purchase preceded their child’s. These cases—particularly when we
include lagged child’s purchases in the regression in Section IV(iii)—isolate
the transmission direction for the state dependence mechanism though not
necessarily for the direct preference inheritance mechanism.
III. DATA
Our data on vehicle ownership come from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). In 1968, the PSID surveyed a nationally representative
sample of households, and since then it has asked them a battery of eco-
nomic and demographic questions every year until 1997 and every two
years thereafter. The PSID collects information on everyone who lives in a
PSID household, but it also follows members of the original PSID sample
households and their children whenever they join or create a new house-
hold. As a result, the survey now collects information on many households
that are members of the same extended family.
The PSID began collecting information on vehicles in 1999. Respondents
report the total number of vehicles that they own or lease and additional
detailed information on up to three vehicles, including vehicle make,
model, and vintage, as well as the date of purchase, purchase price, and
whether the vehicle was a gift. These data are available from surveys
conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. To the best of
our knowledge, the PSID is unique in providing such information for
families in the United States.
Our primary focus is on how parental vehicle brand choices correlate
with the choices of their adult children. Accordingly, our baseline sample is
limited to adult heads of household (or spouses) who purchase a car in the
sample and for whom we can identify a parent who owned a vehicle prior
to their child’s vehicle purchase. We identify 4,338 unique adult children
matched to 2,587 unique parents. The difference between the number of
parents and children is due to the fact that there are many siblings in our
sample.5
Table I shows sample means for both children and parents in this sample.
Adult children are on average 36 years old, whereas parents are 59. Adult
children have higher household income, one more year of education (13.5
5 In our analysis, we cluster standard errors on the original 1968 PSID family in all
regressions to allow for correlated errors across relatives.
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as opposed to 12.5), and larger household sizes, which accords with the
likelihood that they have young children that are still living at home. We
observe 16,054 unique vehicle purchases by these 4,388 adult children.
Excluded from this sample are vehicles that were received as gifts and
vehicles that are likely to have been within-family cross-household sales.6
In cases where parents are separated, but both are present in the PSID
and both have a prior vehicle purchase available, we match the child’s
vehicle choice with data from both parents.7 There are 1,214 such cases,
which gives us 17,268 parent-child vehicle pairs in our main estimation
sample.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INTERGENERATIONAL BRAND
PREFERENCE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we develop and estimate a linear probability model (LPM)
of the relationship between brand choices of children and the choices of
their parents, as well as other covariates. We employ an LPM rather than
a structural discrete choice model because it is more forgiving of the exten-
sive geographic and time fixed effects that we use in our estimation, though
this comes at the cost of not being able to interpret our coefficient estimates
as parameters of a utility function.
To operationalize our brand choice data in the LPM framework, we first
categorize all vehicle choices as being one of seven ‘brands:’ GM, Ford,
Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, other Asian, and European. Grouping smaller
6 Specifically, we drop a child’s vehicle purchase if the parent household owned the same
make, model, and model-year in the previous survey wave and subsequently no longer owns
the vehicle following the child’s purchase.
7 In these cases we weight each vehicle-parent pair by half so that choices that appear twice
in our data are weighted equally to those that appear once. The results are quite similar when
we limit our analysis to only the purchases of the mothers of adult children, regardless of
whether they live with the children’s father.
TABLE I
VARIABLE MEANS AND SAMPLE SIZES IN PSID
Adult children Parents
Age (years) 36.0 59.4
Years of education 13.5 12.5
Annual family income ($) 78,758 61,171
Number of people in household 3.1 2.3
Number of vehicles owned 2.3 2.1
Number of unique individuals 4,388 2,587
Matched Pairs
Number of unique child vehicle choices matched to parent choice 16,054
Total number of parent to child vehicle matches 17,268
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Asian automakers and European manufacturers together ensures that each
brand is chosen frequently enough to yield meaningful estimates in a linear
probability framework (these brand definitions imply that all choice prob-
abilities lie in the 4%–33% range in the raw data).8
We build a linear probability model with multiple choice possibilities
by stacking a set of binary linear probability models for each of our seven
brands. To motivate our approach, we first consider a linear probability
model for a single brand. Our hypothesis is that parental ownership of a
given brand will make a child more likely to choose that brand. For
example, to test this hypothesis for Ford we could run a linear probabil-
ity model in which the dependent variable is coded as one if the child was
observed to choose a Ford. In addition to controls for the child’s demo-
graphics and parents’ demographics, our regressor of interest would be a
dummy variable for the parents’ brand choice, which could be coded as
1 if the parents’ most recent vehicle purchased prior to the child’s pur-
chase was a Ford. The one-brand estimation equation would be:
(2) Ford Fordift pft t ift= ⋅ + + + +γ β δ α εX Xift pft′ ′ ,
where Fordift is coded as 1 if child i of family f at time t chose a Ford, Fordpft
is coded as 1 if parent p’s most recent choice before t was a Ford, αt is a
period-specific constant to capture Ford’s average market share in each
period, Xift are the child’s observable demographic characteristics, and Xpft
are those of the parents. In this regression of ‘Ford against the field,’ all
observations in our data are included.
Instead of running seven separate one-brand linear probability models,
we stack them and run pooled OLS. For each of our seven brands, we
create an observation for each observed choice situation (each car pur-
chase) in which the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the brand is chosen
and zero otherwise. We do this for all seven brands and stack the data,
which generates a final data set that has seven times the number of obser-
vations as our original data set that included one observation per choice.9
The primary independent variable of interest is whether the parents’ most
8 In order to test whether the correlation across generations is coming from a correlated
preference for brand (e.g., Ford) or sub-brand (e.g., Ford, Lincoln, or Mercury), we have run
subsets of our regressions with 41 sub-brands instead of the 7 brands, interacting our control
variables with all 41 sub-brands. In general, we find that both the overall brand and the
sub-brand of the parent have a statistically significant correlation with the sub-brand chosen
by the adult child.
9 Our procedure can also be described as expanding each observed choice as follows. For
each vehicle purchase by every individual in our data, we expand the original data sample to
include seven lines of data. The first is for the brand that was chosen by the individual, and
this line has the dependent variable coded as one. The other six are observations with a zero
dependent variable, one for each of the six brands not chosen.
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recent purchase was of the given brand, although we explore alternative
specifications below.10
We interact all of our regressors with brand dummies, thereby allowing
observed demographic and geographic factors to affect the choice prob-
ability of each brand differently. Thus, all covariates are denoted with a j
subscript or interacted with a coefficient vector of length j. The one restric-
tion that we impose is that the effect of the parents’ past brand choice is
common across brands.11 Thus, instead of seven dummy variables for
parental brands, there is only one dummy variable coded as 1 when the
most recent parental choice matches the brand represented in the corre-
sponding row of data for the child. For each child’s purchase, exactly 1 of
7 observations will have the parental dummy variable coded as 1.12
This leads us to the following estimation equation:
(3) b b bifjt pfjt ifjt j j jt ifjt= 1( = ) ’ ’ ,γ β δ α ε⋅ + + + +X Xift pft
where the dependent variable, bifjt, is a dummy coded as 1 if child i of family
f chose brand j in choice t. The independent variable of primary interest is
a dummy variable that indicates whether the parents’ most recent prior
purchase is of that same brand: 1(bpfjt = bifjt).
Our hypothesis is that the γ coefficient will be positive; that is, children
are more likely to purchase a given brand if their parents have purchased
that brand in the recent past. We control for both child characteristics Xift
and parents’ characteristics Xpft, which enter with brand-specific coefficient
vectors, βj and δj, that we estimate by interacting child and parent charac-
teristics with brand dummies. Finally, we allow for brand-by-month of
purchase fixed effects, αjt to capture overall market shares, leaving εifjt as
the error term.
10 In Section IV(iii) below, we include additional lags of the parents’ choices. In Section
IV(iv), we expand the dataset so that each child’s purchase is matched to all of the parents’
prior purchases, not just the most recent purchase. We have also experimented with an
independent variable measuring the share of parents’ vehicles from a specific brand, as well as
with matching child and parent vehicles one-to-one based on the order in which the vehicles
are listed in the survey. In all cases, our qualitative results are quite similar.
11 By using the linear probability model, we do not impose a restriction that predicted
values must be between zero and one, nor do we require that the sum of the predicted values
across the seven brands must equal one for each choice situation. We have checked our
predicted values for our baseline specifications, and we find that the vast majority of predicted
values are between zero and one, and those that deviate are very small negative numbers.
Similarly, the sum of the predicted values across the seven brands for each choice situation are
tightly distributed around 1.
12 Year of purchase is recorded for all but a handful of very old cars, which we dropped.
Month of purchase is missing for 37% of all child and 31% of all parent purchases, however,
including all purchases in the 2009 and 2011 waves. In establishing whether a parent’s vehicle
was purchased before a child’s vehicle, we treat these observations conservatively by coding
parent purchase months as December and child purchase months as January.
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This setup expands each observed brand choice into seven observations.
Thus, our final dataset has a grouped structure with seven observations per
brand choice, multiple brand choices per child, and multiple children per
nuclear and extended family. The randomized cross-sectional sampling of
the original 1968 PSID families implies that our model’s errors are inde-
pendent across extended families, but we need to worry about potential
dependence within families. Thus, we cluster all standard error calculations
at the level of the 1968 PSID family. This clustering prevents our expansion
to seven lines of data for each brand choice from unduly shrinking the
standard errors. In addition, clustering in this way ensures that our stand-
ard errors are fully robust to the mechanical correlation in the residuals
between the seven observations that represent a single choice (e.g., since a
child that chooses a Ford by definition does not choose a GM), the corre-
lation in each individual’s brand choices across choice situations, and the
correlation across siblings, cousins, and other extended family members.
We also weight each observation using PSID-provided sampling weights so
that the original PSID households on which our sample is based can be
interpreted as representing the U.S. population at the time of the original
survey.
We do not allow for an outside good, which would be interpreted as the
option to not purchase a vehicle at all. Inclusion of an outside good is
standard in discrete choice modeling, but here we are interested in knowing
whether or not a child, conditional on purchasing a vehicle, decides to buy
a brand that is the same as the one owned by members of his or her family.
Inclusion of an outside good would conflate correlations in choice that
determine whether or not individuals purchase vehicles with correlations in
the brand chosen when purchasing a vehicle, which are distinct phenom-
ena.
IV(i). Baseline Results
We begin by showing simple correlations in order to demonstrate the
strength of the intra-family relationship and then demonstrate how the
correlation is affected by various controls. We focus here and in Section
IV(ii) on separating intergenerational brand preference transmission from
choice correlation driven by demographic or geographic factors. Section
IV(iii) then studies whether the choice correlations are caused by short-run
or long-run mechanisms, and in Section IV(iv) we attempt to distinguish
between the intergenerational state dependence and direct brand preference
inheritance mechanisms.
Table II presents coefficient estimates of γ from equation 3, which
regresses the brand chosen by the child on a dummy for whether or not the
parents’ most recent purchase is the same brand. The estimate in column 1,
which includes only month-of-purchase by brand fixed effects that control
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for the overall share of each brand during each period, indicates that a child
is 9.6 percentage points more likely to choose the brand that her parents
chose. There are seven brands in our choice set, so the probability that the
average brand is selected is 0.143. Thus, our estimate implies that a child
whose parents chose a particular brand is 67% more likely to choose that
brand than another child whose parents chose differently.13
This is a remarkably strong relationship, but it may reflect not only the
intergenerational transmission of brand preference that we are interested
in, but also familial correlations in demographic and location-specific
factors that cause related households to demand similar attributes in vehi-
cles, in turn causing a correlation in brand choice.
As a first step toward addressing this issue, we introduce progressively
richer controls in columns 2 through 7 of Table II and examine how the
coefficient estimates change. In column 2 we add demographic controls
(including family income, age, sex, education, number of kids in the house-
hold, and household size) for the child’s household and the parents’ house-
hold.14 The addition of these controls lowers the estimated coefficient from
13 As mentioned above, we have also experimented with the same specification using 41
sub-brands (e.g., Ford, Lincoln and Mercury instead of just Ford) and find that both the
overall brand and the sub-brand of parents are correlated with the child’s sub-brand choice.
14 Each of these characteristics is interacted with a dummy for each brand, which is a
flexible analog to the traditional approach in the automobile demand literature of interacting
vehicle attributes with buyer characteristics. We additionally experimented with a large
assortment of additional financial controls from the PSID, such as amounts spent on vaca-
tions, eating out, health insurance, clothes, and a variety of other expenditures and found that
these did not affect the estimates substantially.
TABLE II
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND PARENTS’ BRAND CHOICE
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.096 0.088 0.077 0.075 0.056 0.050 0.038
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Month of purchase fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ state fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s county fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Child’s census tract fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Number of choices 17,268 17,268 17,268 17,268 17,268 6,937 6,937
R2 0.085 0.096 0.113 0.119 0.216 0.280 0.416
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Each column is a linear probability
model where each individual-year-vehicle choice enters the data 7 times, once for each brand (GM, Ford,
Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, other Asian, and European). Child’s and parents’ demographics include age,
education, income, gender, number of children in household, and family size. All control variables are
interacted with 7 dummies, one for each brand. Columns 6 and 7 limit the sample to households living in
census tracts that contain more than one PSID family.
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0.096 to 0.088. While the modest impact of these controls on the estimated
coefficient is encouraging, the regression’s R2 also changes only slightly,
from 0.085 to 0.096. Following the logic of Altonji et al. [2005], the fact that
this modest increase in explained variation yields a measurable drop in the
estimated coefficient raises the possibility that, if unobserved demographic
factors that affect children’s brand choices are as correlated with parents’
choices as are the observed demographic factors, then these unobservables
may explain much of the observed brand choice correlation. We further
address this issue in Section IV(ii) where we focus on two brands—Ford
and GM—that have very similar attributes so that choices between them
are therefore unlikely to be affected by correlated demographic factors.
The remaining columns of Table II address common geographic factors
that might lead to choice correlation. Column 3 adds state-by-brand fixed
effects, which control for differences in market shares and location-specific
factors that vary by state. Column 4 adds analogous fixed effects for
parents. These fixed effects cause the estimated coefficient to fall from 0.088
to 0.075.
Geographic factors, such as dealer location, local prices, weather and
terrain, may vary significantly within some states. In column 5 we add
county-by-brand fixed effects for the child’s county of residence, which is
intuitively a small enough geographic area to control for most omitted
factors that we have in mind. County fixed effects lower the point estimate
to 0.056, which is approximately 58% of the magnitude of the raw corre-
lation and still highly significant, both statistically and economically. This
estimate implies that parental ownership boosts the conditional probability
that a child buys a given brand by 39%.
We interpret the difference across columns in the estimated effects as
evidence that some location-specific factors are both important in deter-
mining brand choice and correlated across family members (who tend to
live in similar places). Weather, terrain, urbanization and culture are
important determinants of the demand for attributes, which are different
on average across brands. Even conditional on demand, there may be a
different availability of brands across geographic areas due to the location
of dealerships. In our view, most of these differences should be captured by
county-level fixed effects, so column 5 is our preferred specification.
Nonetheless, we can push further and include fixed effects for each
census tract (a unit of approximately 2,500 to 8,000 people) in the sample
to address very fine-scale local factors (local repair shops, for example). We
are able to include these fixed effects because the original PSID sample
design drew stratified samples from particular geographic areas. The legacy
of that original sample design is that PSID households are still more
geographically clustered than would be the case for a random sample of
households. That said, a large number of census tracts in our sample hold
only one PSID family, so to use census tract fixed effects we must first
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restrict the sample to tracts in which we observe multiple families.15
Column 6 re-estimates the model with county level fixed effects on this
subsample, and column 7 estimates a model with census tract fixed effects.
Even when including these effects, our coefficient of interest is economically
and statistically significant. The census tract fixed effects are powerful,
increasing the R2 from 0.280 to 0.416 and further lowering the point esti-
mate between columns 6 and 7 (though the coefficients are still comfortably
within each other’s confidence intervals).16 Even with these very fine geo-
graphic controls, the point estimate suggests that parental ownership
increases the conditional probability that a child purchases a particular
brand by nearly 27%.
Our baseline regressions focus on parental choices determining child
choices, which we believe to be the strongest intrafamily channel of brand
preference transmission. We can, however, configure our data to examine
the relationship that prior purchases by any family member have to sub-
sequent choices by their relatives. To do so, we take every vehicle choice
observed in the data and match it to the most recent purchase made by
every other related household in the dataset (including parents, children,
siblings, cousins, etc.). We then include all of these bilateral relationships in
one regression, down-weighting vehicles that are matched to multiple
family members’ vehicles so that they have equal influence on the estimate
as those that have only one match. This alternative construction expands
our sample size considerably and delivers more precise, but modestly
smaller effects. For example, the all-family matched analog of column 1
from Table II produces a coefficient (standard error) estimate of 0.068
(0.005), and the county fixed effects analog to column 5 produces an
estimate of 0.030 (0.004). These results are consistent with our intuition
that parent-to-child influences are particularly strong, but it also suggests
that broader family network effects have influence.
IV(ii). Estimates Limited to Similar Brands
The principal concern with our baseline regressions is that demographic or
location-specific characteristics of children and parents will be correlated
and that these characteristics drive demand for vehicle attributes that are
correlated with brand. While we believe that controlling for county
and census tract fixed effects adequately addresses location-specific
15 If we do not restrict the sample in this way, the main coefficient is then primarily
identified from within-family variation in brand choice over time rather than cross-family
variation. This identifying variation largely excludes long-term effects from the estimate so
that it cannot be compared to the estimates in columns 1 through 5 (see Section IV(iii) for a
fuller discussion of long-run versus short-run effects).
16 When we restrict our attention to similar brands in Section IV(ii), this decrease in the
point estimate is substantially mitigated.
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confounders, the possibility remains that our estimates are contaminated
by demographic confounders, even after controlling for observables. For
example, individuals who work in construction occupations may be more
likely to have children who work in construction, and both the parents and
children may therefore prefer light trucks to passenger cars. Because GM’s
fleet is more heavily tilted toward light trucks than is Honda’s, both the
parents and children will then be more likely to buy a GM, even in the
absence of any brand preference transmission.
Here, we address this issue by isolating the choice set to two brands that
are very similar: Ford and GM. Ford and GM are both full-line, U.S.-
based automakers that compete directly in every vehicle segment.17 Because
their vehicle lineups are so similar, conditional on local supply, we expect
that random, idiosyncratic variation will largely drive the choice between
Ford and GM in the absence of brand preference. We therefore anticipate
that intrafamily brand choice correlations would be quite weak in the
absence of intrafamily brand preference transmission when we limit our
sample to children who choose either a Ford or a GM. That is, the unob-
served demographic variables that are likely to be correlated between
parents and children are unlikely to drive the choice between these two
brands.
Table III repeats the specifications in Table II for a subset of choices
limited to Ford and GM. Specifically, we keep all instances in which a child
chose either a Ford or GM, which accounts for about 54% of our original
sample.18 As in the full sample, the results are all positive, statistically
significant, and economically large, corroborating our baseline results and
casting doubt on the possibility that the correlation in brand choice across
households is due entirely to demographic confounders. Notably, the esti-
mated coefficient hardly changes going from column 1 to column 2 (it
actually increases slightly) as the demographic controls are added, which
was not the case in the ‘all brands’ specification from Table II. This result
comports with the intuition that demographic factors are unlikely to influ-
ence the choice between Ford and GM. Moreover, if our ‘headline’ demo-
graphic variables are not correlated with the choice between Ford and GM,
it seems unlikely that unobserved factors would be correlated either. It is
also worthwhile to note that when the county fixed effects are replaced with
17 Popular perception holds that Ford and GM are similar brands. We have confirmed this
empirically using a measure of ‘distance’ between brands that borrows from Langer and
Miller [2013], who calculate the distance between pairs of vehicles in attribute space based on
vehicle segment, price, number of passengers, wheelbase, fuel economy, and horsepower for
GM, Ford, Toyota and Chrysler. Using their metric, we have confirmed that Ford and GM
vehicles are on average substantially closer to each other than they are to Toyota or Chrysler.
18 We do not restrict the sample based on whether the parents chose Ford or GM. We do,
however, add an additional control variable for whether the parents’ choice was one of these
two brands. This control helps ensure that the sum of the child’s choice probabilities for the
two brands is close to one.
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census tract fixed effects going from column 6 to column 7, the estimated
coefficient hardly changes despite a substantial increase in R2, suggesting
that county-level effects are sufficient to control for local factors affecting
brand choice.19
The magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat larger in the subsample
in Table III than in the full sample in Table II. Nonetheless, parents’ brand
choice has a slightly smaller percentage effect on child’s choice probabilities
in the restricted sample because the baseline choice probabilities are higher.
In the full sample, the market share for Ford is 22%, while that for GM is
33%. In the subsample, the corresponding figures are 39% for Ford and
61% for GM. Thus, the coefficient of 0.084 in column 5 of Table III (the
county fixed effect specification in the restricted sample) implies that a child
whose parents’ most recent prior purchase was the same brand boosts the
probability of purchase by 22% for Ford and 14% for GM, whereas the
analogous coefficient in Table II (the full sample) represents a 25% effect
for Ford and 17% for GM. This difference is intuitive given that Ford and
GM are generally close substitutes.
Toyota and Honda are also similar brands. They both produce a full
range of sedans and fuel efficient SUV’s, though Honda produces only a
19 As an additional test for local confounders, we have estimated the Ford/GM specifica-
tion using a subsample in which the child lives in a different state than the parents (including
demographics and state fixed effects in the specification, for both child and parent). The point
estimate of γ from this subsample is 0.139, which is actually larger than the estimate of 0.111
from column 4 of Table III.
TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND PARENTS’ BRAND CHOICE AMONG
THOSE OWNING A FORD OR GM
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.135 0.137 0.115 0.111 0.084 0.070 0.065
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.034)
Month of purchase fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ state fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s county fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Child’s census tract fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Number of choices 9,355 9,355 9,355 9,355 9,355 3,587 3,587
R2 0.074 0.076 0.100 0.113 0.268 0.307 0.452
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Sample is limited to the cases where
the child chose Ford or GM. Each column is a linear probability model where each individual-year-vehicle
choice enters the data 7 times, once for each brand (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, other Asian, and
European). Child’s and parents’ demographics include age, education, income, gender, number of children in
household, and family size. All control variables are interacted with 7 dummies, one for each brand. Columns
6 and 7 limit the sample to households living in census tracts that contain more than one PSID family.
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limited set of pickup trucks. Table IV shows results from the same set of
specifications for the sample of observations limited to children who pur-
chased either a Honda or a Toyota, excluding all pickup trucks. The
estimated effects in this subsample are even larger; the county fixed effects
specification in column 5 (our preferred specification) indicates that having
a parent who owns a Honda or Toyota increases the probability that a child
chooses that brand by 63%.20 Honda and Toyota have a smaller market
share than Ford and GM, which leaves us with a smaller sample size and
larger standard errors. Nevertheless, our estimates are statistically signifi-
cant at any conventional level except when we limit the sample to those who
live in a census tract common to another PSID family in our sample
(columns 6 and 7), at which point we lose power.
IV(iii). Long-Run versus Short-Run Effects
In this section, we examine the extent to which the brand choice corre-
lations documented above are driven by long-run or short-run brand
preference transmission. Both long-run and short-run transmission could
be associated with the intergenerational state dependence mechanism or
the direct preference inheritance mechanism. For instance, long-run
transmission could derive from early childhood experience with a brand
20 A 31.4 percentage point increase on an average market share of 50% is a 63% increase.
TABLE IV
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND PARENTS’ BRAND CHOICE AMONG
THOSE OWNING A HONDA OR TOYOTA
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.228 0.233 0.265 0.269 0.314 0.500 0.549
(0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.071) (0.353) (0.511)
Month of purchase fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ state fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s county fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Child’s census tract fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Number of choices 2,327 2,327 2,327 2,327 2,327 352 352
R2 0.116 0.126 0.160 0.200 0.469 0.826 0.909
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Sample is limited to the cases where
the child chose Honda or Toyota. Each column is a linear probability model where each individual-year-
vehicle choice enters the data 7 times, once for each brand (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, other Asian,
and European). Child’s and parents’ demographics include age, education, income, gender, number of
children in household, and family size. All control variables are interacted with 7 dummies, one for each brand.
Columns 6 and 7 limit the sample to households living in census tracts that contain more than one PSID
family.
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or from parents’ repeated statements to a child that they believe one
brand to be better or more reliable than another. Short-run transmission
could come from information about parents’ recent purchases or from
parent-child discussions about recent reviews or advertisements for a par-
ticular brand.
We begin by studying how children’s brand choices correlate with mul-
tiple previous choices of their parents, including both the most recent
choices as well as earlier choices. To do so, we augment our baseline
regression with indicator variables for whether the brand of each child’s
purchase matches the brand of the parents’ lagged purchases.21
Ideally, we would like to use parents’ complete life history of vehicle
ownership to test how vehicles owned at different points in their children’s
lives influenced the children’s subsequent choices. Unfortunately, we are
limited to seven waves of data, which leaves us with relatively few car
purchases for most families and a complete history for none. Thus, we are
only able estimate and compare how children’s brand choices correlate
with the most recent versus somewhat less recent choices of their parents. If
children’s brand choices correlate more strongly with their parents’ most
recent choices, then short-run preference transmission is likely important.
If less recent parent choices still have predictive power conditional on
recent parent choices, then longer-run preference transmission is also likely
important.22
When we add parents’ lagged brand choices to the regression, we also
add indicators for the children’s own lagged brand choices. We do so for
two reasons. First, in the presence of within-household state dependence,
the lagged choices of a parent may continue to influence a child’s current
choice indirectly via the child’s earlier brand purchase. Thus, to test
whether lagged parent purchases have a direct long-run influence on child
choices, we must control for the child’s lagged purchases.
Second, these lags help, in part, to identify parent-to-child transmission
separately from child-to-parent transmission. In particular, children’s
choices might have a short-run influence on the preferences of their
parents—the state dependence mechanism from child to parent. If so, then
this correlation could propagate via within-household state dependence to
generate a longer-term correlation between recent child choices and lagged
parent choices. Conditioning directly on the lagged choices of children
21 Observations of lagged purchases are not available for all child’s purchases. Rather than
drop observations that are missing lags, we also include in our regressions interactions
between the brand dummies and indicator variables (one for each lag in the regression) that
equal one if the lag is missing.
22 For reference, the average time elapsed between the child’s purchase and the parents’
lagged and second lagged purchases are 40 months and 65 months, respectively. Thus, even
our limited specification is suggestive of effects that take place over several years.
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helps protect against this concern.23 Unfortunately, these lags do not
address the possibility that children might influence their parents through
the direct preference inheritance mechanism. For instance, a child might
tell her parents about a recent blog post arguing that Fords are a great buy,
leading both the parents and then the child to buy a Ford. In this case, child
and parent choices will be correlated, even controlling for the child’s lagged
purchases.24
Table V reports linear probability model regressions that include indica-
tors for parents’ and children’s lagged purchases. All regressions use our
preferred specification with demographic controls and county fixed effects.
Columns 1 through 3 use all seven brands and include, progressively, zero,
23 Of course, child-to-parent state dependence could arise from more distant child’s pur-
chases than the second lag. We have also estimated specifications that include third and
fourth lags of children’s purchases and found that doing so has only a minor effect on the
estimated coefficients. For instance, adding third and fourth own-lags to specification (3) of
Table V below reduces the coefficient on the indicator for parents’ brand = child’s brand from
0.040 to only 0.038.
24 We focus here on short-run preference transmission, since it seems unlikely that young
children still living with their parents would be able to influence the longer-run brand
preferences of their parents in this way.
TABLE V
LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND
PARENTS’ BRAND CHOICE
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
All brands Ford and GM only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.056 0.042 0.040 0.084 0.059 0.058
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016)
Lagged parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.044 0.040 0.080 0.075
(0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.020)
2nd lagged parents’ brand = child’s brand 0.018 0.013
(0.008) (0.024)
Lagged child’s brand = child’s brand 0.131 0.124 0.225 0.214
(0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.019)
2nd lagged child’s brand = child’s brand 0.068 0.092
(0.007) (0.023)
Month of purchase fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s census tract fixed effects No No No No No No
Number of choices 17,268 17,268 17,268 9,355 9,355 9,355
R2 0.216 0.229 0.232 0.268 0.293 0.297
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Each column is a linear probability
model where each individual-year-vehicle choice enters once for each brand. Child’s and parents’ demograph-
ics include age, education, income, gender, number of children in household, and family size. All control
variables are interacted with dummies for each brand.
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one, and two lags of both the parents’ and children’s purchases; columns 4
through 6 repeat these specifications for the Ford and GM subsample. The
results show little difference between the estimated coefficients on the
parents’ most recent and lagged choice. In the Ford and GM subsample,
the lagged coefficient is actually larger than the most recent coefficient,
though the two are not statistically distinct (p = 0.527 in column 6). Parents
own 2.1 vehicles on average (see table I), so the similarity of the most recent
and first lagged brand choice of parents may reflect the fact that the two
most recent purchases on average represent the parents’ current fleet. The
estimated coefficients on the parents’ second lag are, however, substantially
smaller than those on the parents’ most recent purchase. This difference is
statistically significant (p = 0.031) for the all brands sample and marginally
significant (p = 0.116) for the Ford/GM subsample. The estimated coeffi-
cients on the parents’ second lagged choices themselves are positive (and
statistically significant in the all brands sample). Overall, these results
suggest that both short-run and long-run preference transmission are at
work.25
We next attempt to isolate the short-run mechanism by examining
regression models that include a fixed effect for each child household.
These fixed effects account for any household-level permanent brand
preference so that the only source of identification comes from changes in
parents’ brand choices over time. For these regressions, we revert to our
original specification that includes only the parents’ most recent brand
choice.
Results from the household fixed effects specification are given in Table
VI, in which all columns include demographic controls. Column 1 includes
all seven brands, while column 2 uses only the Ford and GM subsample to
guard against time-varying unobservable demographic factors that may be
correlated between child and parent. In both of these specifications, the
estimated coefficient of interest is positive but statistically insignificant. To
improve the estimates’ precision, we expand the sample to include all
bilateral relationships that are available in the data (that is, including
siblings, uncles, cousins, etc. as discussed at the end of Section IV(i)
above). When we use this expanded sample, the estimated correlation
between children’s choices and relatives’ choices is positive and statistically
25 We are limited in how many lags we can include by data availability. Another approach
is to proxy for the parents’ past purchases by including directly the market share of each
brand in the parents’ geographic region further back in time. We do not, however, have
market share data at the subnational level for most years. We can construct market shares for
1990 at the level of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) using the National Household
Transportation Survey. When we include the 1990 market share of the brand in the parents’
MSA as an additional control variable, we find that these market shares are positively
correlated with child choice, but statistically imprecise.
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significant, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table VI.26 While the magni-
tudes of these coefficients are small relative to those obtained without
household fixed effects (the corresponding point estimates are 0.062 for
column 3 and 0.102 for column 4, still using the ‘all relatives’ sample), they
nonetheless provide evidence that brand preference transmission has a
short-run component and is not entirely driven by childhood experiences.
IV(iv). Tests for Intergenerational State Dependence
In this section, we explore the extent to which we can distinguish
intergenerational state dependence from direct preference inheritance. To
do so, we use variation in the exposure of children to their parents’ vehicles,
under the logic that an increase in exposure should strengthen the state
dependence mechanism but not the direct preference inheritance mecha-
nism. Specifically, we study whether children are more strongly influenced
by vehicles that their parents owned while they still lived with their parents,
under the presumption that children were more likely to have direct expo-
sure to such vehicles.
26 We have also run the column 4 specification while including county fixed effects to
account for households that move during the sample. The results are robust to these fixed
effects: the estimated coefficient and standard error are 0.016 and 0.006, respectively. We have
not run the column 3 specification with county fixed effects due to computer memory
constraints.
TABLE VI
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND RELATIVE’S BRAND CHOICE,
INCLUDING HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
Match to parents only Match to all relatives
All brands Ford and GM All brands Ford and GM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative’s brand = child’s brand 0.007 0.038 0.006 0.020
(0.009) (0.028) (0.002) (0.007)
Month of purchase fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relative’s demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects No No No No
Relative’s state fixed effects No No No No
Child’s county fixed effects No No No No
Child’s census tract fixed effects No No No No
Number of choices 17,268 9,355 126,893 71,775
R2 0.462 0.591 0.477 0.593
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Each column is a linear probability
model where each individual-year-vehicle choice enters once for each brand (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota,
Honda, other Asian, and European). Child’s and Relative’s demographics include age, education, income,
gender, number of children in household, and family size. All control variables are interacted with dummies
for each brand.
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For this analysis, we expand the sample by matching each child’s choice
to all observed choices by their parents that precede the child’s choice, not
just to the parents’ most recent purchase. Thus, for each vehicle that a child
purchased, there may be multiple observations in the regression sample,
one for each parent purchase.27 For each matched child and parent pur-
chase, we then identify whether the parents’ purchase was made while the
child was still living in the parents’ household. There are 16,115 such ‘child
at home’ purchases made by parents in the data, out of 58,420 total parent
purchases. On average, the children in this subsample are 16.9 years old
while living at home when their parents buy a vehicle (standard devia-
tion = 5.5 years) and 26.0 years old when they buy their own vehicle after
having moved out (standard deviation = 4.6 years). The average age at
which children matched to ‘at home’ cars move out of their parents’ home
is approximately 22.4 years old.28
Our primary variable of interest is an interaction between the indicator
for whether the parents’ brand choice matches the child’s brand choice with
an indicator for whether the parents’ purchase occurred while the child was
still at home. Our idea is that children will have had more exposure to a car
that their parents owned if they lived with their parents during the owner-
ship period. This interacted variable may also be capturing age effects,
however, because children are on average younger during the time in which
they live with their parents. If children are more impressionable while they
are young, then our interaction term may be positive because of a correla-
tion with age. We address this possibility by allowing the relationship
between the parents’ brand choice and the child’s brand choice to vary
flexibly with the child’s age at the time of the parents’ purchase. Age effects
may be nonlinear, so we include interactions between whether the parents’
brand choice matches the child’s brand choice and polynomials up to a
cubic in the child’s age. Finally, our regression specification also accounts
for decay in brand preference transmission over time by controlling for the
length of time between the child’s and parents’ purchases (interacted with
the child’s brand = parents’ brand indicator).
27 To be clear, we do not add parents’ past brand choices as lagged regressors, as we did in
Section IV(iii) above. Instead, we create a separate observation for each child-parent match.
We do so for two reasons. First, the number of available parent purchases varies substantially
across child households. Second, this approach eases the interpretation of the interacted
regressors discussed below. We re-weight the observations in this expanded sample such that
every case of a child’s vehicle choice receives equal weight, regardless of how many parent
vehicles it was matched to; we then apply the PSID sampling weights. As before, we ulti-
mately expand this sample according to the number of brands in our linear probability model
framework.
28 We do not know the exact date at which children moved out; we only know the survey
date at which each child is observed in his/her own household. The average age at this
observation is 23.4; we subtract one year under the assumption that move-out dates are
uniformly distributed across the two years between surveys.
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Table VII reports linear probability model regressions that add these
interacted regressors in the expanded set of child-parent matched vehicles.
We use our preferred specification with demographic controls and county
fixed effects in all regressions. Columns 1 through 3 use all seven brands
and include progressively richer polynomials in the child’s age at the time of
the parents’ purchase; columns 4 through 6 repeat these specifications for
the Ford and GM subsample. Our focus is on the interaction between the
brand choices of parents and whether or not the child lived at home when
the vehicle was purchased (the second variable in Table VII). The estimated
coefficient on this interaction term is positive in all specifications and is
statistically significant in all three columns of the Ford and GM subsample,
providing evidence that at least some of the intergenerational brand choice
correlation is being driven by state dependence. Overall, this result is robust
to increasing the richness of the age-at-purchase polynomial, and the
TABLE VII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHILD’S BRAND CHOICE AND PARENTS’ BRAND CHOICE
INTERACTED WITH WHETHER CHILD WAS LIVING WITH PARENTS
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Child’s Brand
All brands Ford and GM only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents’ brand = child’s
brand
0.0316 0.0364 0.0535 0.0191 −0.0342 −0.0285
(0.0152) (0.0228) (0.0259) (0.0390) (0.0727) (0.0799)
(Parents’ brand = child’s
brand)
0.0144 0.0138 0.0148 0.0608 0.0683 0.0687
(0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0310)
× child at home
(Parents’ brand = child’s
brand)
4.52e-04 1.05e-04 −2.44e-03 0.00144 0.00540 0.00453
(4.86e-04) (1.52e-03) (2.79e-03) (0.00130) (0.00507) (0.00907)
× child’s age at purchase
(Parents’ brand = child’s
brand)
5.69e-06 1.08e-04 −6.60e-05 −3.05e-05
(2.64e-05) (1.09e-04) (8.65e-05) (3.67e-04)
× (child’s age at purchase)2
(Parents’ brand = child’s
brand)
−1.20e-06 −4.21e-07
(1.34e-06) (4.62e-06)
× (child’s age at purchase)3
(Parents’ brand = child’s
brand)
−2.94e-06 −3.03e-06 −3.39e-06 −2.80e-06 −1.79e-06 −1.90e-06
(2.98e-06) (3.04e-06) (3.31e-06) (5.29e-06) (5.06e-06) (4.80e-06)
x months since purchase
Month of purchase fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s census tract fixed
effects
No No No No No No
Number of choice pairs 58,420 58,420 58,420 31,078 31,078 31,078
R2 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.265 0.265 0.265
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 1968 PSID family are in parentheses. Each column is a linear probability
model where each individual-year-vehicle choice enters once for each brand. Child’s and parents’ demograph-
ics include age, education, income, gender, number of children in household, and family size. All control
variables are interacted with dummies for each brand.
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polynomial coefficients themselves are consistent with intergenerational
brand choice correlation being stronger for older children.29 This age effect
reflects the possibility that once they have moved out of the house, older
children are more attuned to vehicle brands than younger children (perhaps
due to budget constraints early in adult life). Finally, the interaction
between the parents’ brand choice dummy and the time elapsed between
the parents’ and child’s purchases is negative (though insignificant) in all
specifications. This last result suggests that the influence of the parents’
choice on the child’s choice decays over time, consistent with the findings
from the lag models studied in Section IV(iii).30
V. IMPLICATIONS OF BRAND PREFERENCE TRANSMISSION FOR THE
VEHICLE MARKET
What might intergenerational brand preference transmission imply for
firms’ strategies and market outcomes in the automobile industry? Some
implications are closely related to established findings in the literature
regarding within-household brand attachment. For example, Bronnenberg
et al. [2012] shows that state dependence in brand choice will strengthen
incumbent firms by increasing barriers to entry and limiting the speed with
which market shares may change over time. It is intuitive to expect that
intergenerational preference transmission will exacerbate these effects by
tying young consumers—who would otherwise be unattached to a brand
and therefore open toward new entrants or smaller firms—to their
parents’ preferred brand. This mechanism might be important for gener-
ating entry barriers and explaining persistent brand shares in the automo-
bile market, which is characterized by relatively infrequent purchases and
a high degree of product differentiation that is strongly correlated with
consumer age. In the absence of intergenerational state dependence, we
might expect new entrants to have relatively little difficulty in penetrating
29 Omitting age effects entirely reduces the estimate of the coefficient of interest by roughly
one-third. This result occurs because the ‘at home’ effect is conflated with the effect of
purchases occurring at a young age.
30 In investigating state dependence, we have also explored whether the intergenerational
correlation in brand choice is weaker if the parents had a poor experience with a vehicle. To
identify vehicles that were likely of poor quality, we used wholesale auction price data to
estimate a depreciation rate for each vintage of each model and matched these depreciation
rates to the parents’ car choices. While our point estimates on the interaction of depreciation
rates with parents’ brand choice indicate that the intergenerational correlation is weaker for
vehicles that proved to be of low quality, these regressions lack statistical power and we thus
omit them from the paper. As an alternative approach, we simply interacted parents’ brand
choice with the length of time that the parents owned their vehicles; we imagine that parents
would get rid of disappointing vehicles more quickly. While the intergenerational correlation
is weaker for cars that parents held for shorter periods, this result does not necessarily indicate
state dependence, for parents would also hold vehicles for shorter periods if the vehicles were
a poor fit for the parents’ underlying preferences.
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the market for small, entry-level models targeted at young consumers by
offering cars of similar price and quality as incumbents. Then, having
built up their loyalty among this aging generation of consumers,
such firms could more easily enter the market for larger, upscale models.
In the presence of intergenerational preference transmission, however,
new entrants will be forced to offer lower prices and higher quality for
cars targeted at young consumers, which will act as a strong barrier to
entry.
Our findings also relate to the literature on switching costs, which focuses
on how state dependence in consumers’ brand choices affects firms’ profits
in equilibrium (Klemperer [1987], Dubé et al. [2009], Somaini and Einav
[2013]). Incorporating intergenerational state dependence into traditional
switching cost models yields distinct implications in settings like the auto-
mobile industry in which firms offer multiple products targeted at consum-
ers of different ages. To see the intuition, consider a simple overlapping
generations model in which every consumer lives for two periods, buys two
cars during his or her lifetime—one entry-level model while young and one
upscale model while old—and has a child while old that becomes a young
consumer in the next period. If consumers have state dependent brand
preferences and do not pass these preferences on to their children, then this
model resembles the one analyzed in Klemperer [1987], which establishes
that firms will lower prices for young consumers to ‘invest’ in brand loyalty
and then ‘harvest’ that loyalty among older consumers by charging higher
prices.
Intergenerational state dependence disrupts this logic. When consumers
inherit a preference for the car their parents chose, firms will have an
incentive to lower prices on upscale models aimed at older consumers to
invest in brand loyalty among the next generation of young consumers.
Meanwhile, since young consumers enter the market with brand loyalty
inherited from their parents, firms will have an incentive to harvest this
loyalty by raising prices on entry-level models. Thus, relative to the model
with no intergenerational state dependence, equilibrium prices for upscale
cars should fall. Conversely, prices for entry-level cars should rise. In the
extreme, if the dependence of children’s preferences on their parents’
choices is as strong as within-generation state dependence, then the over-
lapping generations become equivalent to an infinitely lived consumer with
constant loyalty. In this case, the problem resembles the switching cost
model of Dubé et al. [2009], in which firms balance harvesting and investing
incentives in every period, and there is no economic distinction between
young and old consumers.
In Appendix A on the Journal’s website, we set up and solve a simple
version of this model with two symmetric Bertrand-competing firms that
sell cars to consumers who live two periods each, buying a different type of
car each period. Consumers have logit demand with a brand switching cost
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that we calibrate using our estimates from Section IV.31 For simplicity, we
assume that the young and old car markets have the same cost and demand
parameters. When we allow for within-household but not intergenerational
state dependence, the model reproduces the Klemperer [1987] style result
that equilibrium prices are lower for cars targeted at young consumers than
for cars targeted at older consumers. However, when intergenerational
state dependence is as strong as within-household state dependence, the
model is equivalent to that of Dubé et al. [2009], and equilibrium prices are
equal for both types of cars. We also present an intermediate case between
these two extremes. Consistent with the intuition above, prices for cars
aimed at older consumers fall and prices for cars aimed at younger con-
sumers rise in the presence of intergenerational state dependence.
In our calibrated examples, the net effect of state dependence on average
prices and firm profits is negative. This result echoes a similar finding by
Dubé et al. [2009] in consumer packaged goods markets: when switching
costs are modest, their presence may cause prices and profits to decline
because firms are never able fully to capitalize on their customers’ brand
loyalty as they constantly compete for the next generation of consumers.32
This finding may also speak to the auto industry’s apparent focus on sales
volumes to the potential neglect of current profits. The industry media is
filled with stories about market share, sales volumes, and conquest rates.
Anecdotally, automakers are said to focus on hitting quarterly sales targets,
deeply discounting or even selling some vehicles at a loss to meet these
targets. It is natural for an economist to view such prioritization of sales
volumes over profitability as a mistake. In the presence of strong brand
preferences, however, firms face a tradeoff between current and future
profits, potentially justifying this focus on volume. Moreover, transmission
of brand preferences across generations limits the incentive to harvest
brand preferences among older consumers, as doing so might jeopardize
the loyalty of future generations.
Intergenerational brand preference transmission may influence not only
how firms set prices for the goods that they sell, but also the set of products
they choose to develop. Most automakers offer a wide range of vertically
differentiated products. State dependence provides one rationale for such a
strategy. The stronger are brand preferences, the more valuable it is to keep
consumers within the brand as they move through their life cycle and
demand different types of cars.33 When households have state-dependent
31 We also use within-household brand choice correlations that we discuss in Appendix B,
which likewise appears on the Journal’s website.
32 Cabral [2009] further discusses why the investment incentive to lower prices is first-order
while the harvesting incentive to raise prices is second-order.
33 There are, of course, many other reasons why firms might offer a broad set of vertically
differentiated goods apart from consumer brand preferences, including production econo-
mies of scope and the value of covering a wide range of consumers’ attribute preferences.
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brand preferences, producers have an incentive to develop entry-level offer-
ings that will ‘lead’ consumers to their profitable upscale goods as they age.
If brand preferences are transmitted between generations, however, then
producers of entry-level models will also have an incentive to develop
upscale product lines to ‘lead’ future generations to their entry-level prod-
ucts. The ability of upscale products to boost future sales of downmarket
products may, for instance, help explain the relatively slow growth of
Toyota and Honda in the 1980’s, and Hyundai and Kia today, which offer
mainly entry-level vehicles but do so at a low price given their high quality.
These considerations may also help explain the competition between
Ford and GM early in the twentieth century. Ford initially succeeded by
selling a single, affordable vehicle—the model T—and by driving down
costs through economies of scale. Henry Ford had no interest in product
differentiation and famously quipped of the Model T that ‘any customer
can have a car painted any colour [sic] that he wants so long as it is black.’34
Meanwhile, GM’s strategy was to build a variety of cars to fit a range of
lifestyles and income levels, embodied by the famous quote from Alfred
Sloan that GM would sell ‘a car for every purse and purpose.’35 As cars first
became affordable to the masses, brand loyalty would have been minimal
because most consumers had not previously owned a car, nor had their
parents owned a car. This limited the initial benefits to GM’s approach.
Over time, however, strong within-household brand preference would
have allowed GM to charge higher prices to consumers who ‘graduated’ to
their upscale models. This would have given GM an extra incentive to cut
prices on their entry-market cars, which were in competition with Ford’s
Model T, in order to gain future loyal upscale customers. Furthermore,
having no upscale model would have also put Ford at a competitive dis-
advantage among the subsequent generation’s entry-level consumers if
intergenerational brand preference transmission was strong. That is, the
children of consumers who had progressed to an upscale GM model would
have inherited a preference for GM before they went to buy their first
(entry-level) car. Thus, both within-household and intergenerational brand
preference transmission may have been important in determining the ulti-
mate success of GM’s differentiated approach, which Ford itself later
adopted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of PSID data suggests that automobile brand preferences may
be passed through generations in ways that are important to the strategies
34 The quote is from Henry Ford’s 1922 autobiography My Life and Work. See: http://
www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/hnfrd10.txt.
35 This quote is taken from GM’s 1924 report to shareholders.
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of automobile producers. We document a strong correlation across gen-
erations in brand choice that remains strong even when limiting the analy-
sis to similar brands and controlling for a rich set of demographic factors
and fine geographic fixed effects, leading us to conclude that intrafamily
correlations are likely not driven entirely by correlated demographic char-
acteristics but rather reflect an important role for intergenerational brand
preference transmission. Further, our finding that intergenerational choice
correlation is stronger when children are directly exposed to their parents’
vehicles suggests a role for intergenerational state dependence, in which
actual experience with a vehicle is important for influencing brand choice
across generations.
These results inform our understanding of endogenous preference for-
mation, complementing recent work that has focused on the role of local
tastes and geography in shaping consumers’ preferences (Logan and Rhode
[2010], Atkin [2013], Bronnenberg et al. [2012]). They may also inform
automakers’ pricing and product-line incentives. Intuition suggests, and
our numerical simulations in the Appendix on the Journal’s website
confirm, that intergenerational state dependence curtails firms’ ability to
price discriminate across young and old consumers, since charging a high
price to old consumers today reduces sales to young consumers tomorrow.
That is, the ‘invest in young consumers and harvest old consumers’ strategy
(Klemperer [1987]) is no longer optimal when parents’ choices affect the
preferences of their children. More broadly, intergenerational state depend-
ence may also enhance firms’ incentive to offer a broad range of products
that appeal to consumers over their entire lifetime, thereby allowing mul-
tiple generations within a family to preserve their brand loyalty.
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